Xi Jinping has expanded his unprecedented military purge to include the two most senior officers in the People’s Liberation Army, reducing the Central Military Commission to just two functioning members out of its original seven (ISW). The sweeping removals, which have accelerated since 2023, represent the most aggressive consolidation of military power under a single Chinese leader in decades. At the same time, the United States released a 2026 National Defense Strategy that conspicuously omitted Taiwan and downgraded competition with China compared to previous iterations (AEI).
The convergence of these developments raises serious questions about the stability of cross-strait deterrence. Beijing’s internal military upheaval is unfolding alongside signals from Washington that could be read as reduced commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Taiwan itself remains locked in a domestic political standoff over military spending that threatens to undermine its own readiness.
Xi’s Military Purge
The Central Military Commission, China’s supreme military decision-making body, has been gutted by a rolling purge that now leaves only Xi Jinping and one other member in place (ISW). The two most recently removed officers were the highest-ranking PLA figures to fall in the campaign that began in 2023. Their removal follows earlier purges of senior officials linked to the Rocket Force and equipment procurement sectors, which Beijing attributed to corruption.
The purges serve Xi’s goal of absolute personal control over the military chain of command. By eliminating potential rivals and installing loyalists, Xi has ensured that no faction within the PLA can challenge his authority or slow his modernization agenda. However, analysts warn that a CMC operating with only two members creates dangerous structural vulnerabilities in military decision-making (ISW).
The risk of isolation is significant. With so few senior voices in the room, Xi may receive filtered or overly optimistic intelligence assessments that reinforce his existing views rather than challenge them. Military miscalculations become more likely when the leader responsible for decisions about Taiwan, the South China Sea, and nuclear posture operates without genuine internal debate (AEI).
US Defense Strategy Shift
The 2026 National Defense Strategy marked a notable departure from the 2022 edition, which had placed PRC aggression toward Taiwan at the center of American strategic planning (AEI). The new document did not mention Taiwan at all, and it broadly deemphasized great-power competition with China relative to other security priorities. The shift reflects a broader reorientation within the current administration toward other regions and threat categories.
Beijing is likely to interpret the omission as a signal of weakening American resolve on Taiwan. PRC strategists have long monitored US defense documents for indicators of Washington’s willingness to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, and the absence of Taiwan from the NDS provides ammunition for those in Beijing who argue that the United States would not fight over the island (ISW). The deemphasis could embolden more assertive Chinese behavior in the region, including increased military pressure on Taiwan and expanded operations in the South China Sea.
The CMC purges consolidate Xi’s control over the PLA but simultaneously risk isolating him from critical feedback loops, increasing the probability of strategic miscalculation during a crisis.
Taiwan Defense Standoff
Taiwan’s opposition parties have blocked the Special Budget for Asymmetric Warfare for the eighth consecutive time since December 2025 (ISW). The Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party have refused to approve the funding package, which is designed to procure the mobile, dispersed weapons systems that military planners consider essential for deterring a Chinese amphibious assault. The repeated rejections have left Taiwan’s asymmetric defense modernization in limbo at a moment of heightened regional tension.
The political gridlock stands in contrast to progress in US-Taiwan military cooperation. Taipei launched a Joint Firepower Coordination Center with American participation, establishing a permanent mechanism for coordinating targeting and fire support between the two militaries (ISW). The center, based in Taipei, represents a deepening of operational integration that goes beyond previous advisory arrangements.
Taiwan’s judiciary also moved against suspected Chinese espionage operations on the island. Prosecutors indicted a businessman and a retired government official on charges of recruiting spies for the PRC (ISW). The case underscores Beijing’s ongoing intelligence collection efforts targeting Taiwan’s military, political, and economic institutions.
PLA Invasion Capabilities
The PLA continues to develop unmanned systems specifically designed for amphibious operations against Taiwan (ISW). Chinese military research institutions and defense contractors are advancing work on unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, and unmanned underwater vehicles that could be deployed in a cross-strait invasion scenario. These platforms are intended to perform reconnaissance, mine clearance, logistics delivery, and direct combat roles during amphibious landings.
The unmanned systems push reflects a broader PLA strategy to reduce the human cost of an amphibious assault while increasing the speed and volume of forces that can be projected across the Taiwan Strait. Autonomous and semi-autonomous platforms could overwhelm Taiwan’s coastal defenses through sheer numbers, operating in swarms that are difficult to counter with conventional weapons. The development timeline suggests the PLA views these capabilities as integral to any future military option against Taiwan rather than as experimental supplements (AEI).
The combination of Xi’s consolidated authority, advancing military capabilities, and potential perceptions of reduced American commitment creates a volatile strategic environment in the Taiwan Strait. Whether the 2026 NDS omission of Taiwan reflects a deliberate policy shift or bureaucratic oversight, its impact on deterrence calculations in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington will unfold over the coming months. Taiwan’s inability to pass its own defense budget only compounds the uncertainty facing planners on all sides of the strait.