Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar arrived in Beijing on March 31 for talks aimed at drawing China into a more substantive role in mediating the US-Iran war. The visit, which Dar undertook despite a hairline shoulder fracture sustained in a recent fall, follows a quadrilateral meeting of foreign ministers held in Islamabad on March 29 that brought together diplomats from Turkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia alongside Pakistan.
The central question surrounding Dar’s Beijing visit is whether Pakistan can move China beyond rhetorical support for peace into a position of active diplomatic engagement — and potentially into the role of guarantor for any future agreement between Washington and Tehran.
The Islamabad Framework
The March 29 quadrilateral meeting in Islamabad produced what diplomats described as five principles being refined as a basis for potential negotiations. These include an immediate ceasefire, resumption of direct talks between the warring parties, protection of civilian populations, maritime security in the Persian Gulf and surrounding waterways, and adherence to the United Nations Charter.
The framework remains aspirational. None of the parties to the conflict have endorsed it, and the United States has not publicly acknowledged the Islamabad meeting’s outcomes. Iran’s 15-point rejection of the Trump administration’s own proposal, which Tehran called “extremely maximalist and unreasonable,” suggests that significant gaps remain between the positions of the warring sides.
China’s Rhetorical Support
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a phone call with Dar on March 27, commended Pakistan’s “untiring efforts to cool down the situation.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters that China “stands ready to enhance communication and coordination” on the conflict.
These statements follow a pattern of Chinese diplomatic language that expresses concern and willingness to engage without committing to specific actions. Beijing has consistently called for restraint and dialogue since the air campaign began on February 28 but has not taken concrete steps to intervene diplomatically.
The Guarantor Question
Iran has asked for guarantees in any deal. Word is the Pakistan foreign minister is going to Beijing to get a guarantor for a potential deal.
Vali Nasr, a former senior adviser at the US State Department, pointed to a specific Iranian demand that may explain the urgency of Dar’s Beijing trip. According to Nasr, Iran has sought guarantees that any agreement reached with the United States would be honoured — a demand rooted in Tehran’s experience with the 2015 nuclear deal, from which the US withdrew in 2018, and in the current conflict, where Iranian officials say they twice engaged in diplomatic discussions only to face renewed attacks.
If Iran is indeed seeking a major-power guarantor, China is one of very few states with both the diplomatic weight and the relationship with Tehran to play such a role. However, analysts are divided on whether Beijing would accept that responsibility.
Pakistan can mediate between the US and Iran. China cannot.
Yun Sun of the Stimson Center argued that China’s own adversarial relationship with Washington makes it unsuitable as a direct mediator, though she did not rule out a more limited Chinese role behind the scenes.
China’s Strategic and Economic Stakes
China’s interest in the conflict’s resolution is grounded in concrete economic exposure. In 2025, China imported approximately 1.38 million barrels of crude oil per day from Iran, accounting for roughly 12 percent of its total crude imports. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached an estimated $41.2 billion in 2025, underpinned by a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement signed in 2021 that is valued at up to $400 billion over its lifetime.
Beyond the bilateral relationship, China faces systemic risk from the conflict’s impact on maritime commerce. An estimated 45 to 50 percent of China’s crude oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which approximately 20 million barrels of oil flowed daily in 2024 — roughly 20 percent of global consumption. Any sustained disruption to Hormuz traffic would have immediate consequences for Chinese energy security and, by extension, the global economy.
The IRGC’s claimed strikes on shipping in the Persian Gulf, including a reported ballistic missile attack on an Israeli container ship on March 31, underscore the ongoing threat to maritime commerce in the region.
Pakistan’s Positioning
Pakistan occupies a unique position in this diplomatic landscape. It maintains functional relationships with both the United States and Iran, shares a border with Iran, and has historically served as a channel for communication between parties that cannot or will not speak directly. Islamabad’s ability to convene the quadrilateral meeting with Turkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia demonstrated a degree of diplomatic credibility on the issue.
However, Pakistan’s influence has limits. It is not a major military or economic power relative to the parties at war, and its ability to offer security guarantees or enforcement mechanisms is constrained. The value of Dar’s Beijing visit may lie less in securing a formal Chinese commitment than in establishing a communication channel through which Chinese interests — particularly energy security — can be factored into any eventual negotiation framework.
What Comes Next
The diplomatic track remains fragile. The United States continues to describe negotiations as “very real” and “gaining strength,” according to Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, while simultaneously intensifying its air campaign. Iran has rejected Washington’s proposals while expressing willingness to talk — albeit with deep mistrust born of what it describes as repeated diplomatic betrayals.
Pakistan’s mediation effort, now extended to Beijing, represents the most structured multilateral diplomatic initiative to emerge since the conflict began. Whether it can bridge the gap between a United States that frames the war as nearing its objectives and an Iran that sees the American terms as unacceptable remains an open question. China’s willingness to move beyond carefully worded statements of concern may prove to be the variable that determines whether the Islamabad framework gains traction or joins the growing list of unfulfilled peace proposals.